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Abstract 
In this paper, “innovative intelligence–biased technological change” (IIBTC) is examined as an 
alternative to the traditional concept of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) as a source of 
increases in wage inequality. The innovative intelligence of ordinary or average workers is an 
important element in productivity and can be heterogeneous across workers. Because 
technologies are heterogeneous in that they have different characteristics and are used in different 
situations, some technologies are “innovative intelligence-biased” and are advantageous for 
workers with relatively high innovative intelligence. If IIBTC prevails over a certain period of 
time, these workers become additionally advantaged and thereby wage inequality will increase 
during the period.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Until the early 2000s, the view that skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is the main cause 
of the recent increase in wage inequality was widely accepted (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et 
al., 1998, 2003). Explanations based on SBTC were often combined with the Stolper–Samuelson 
theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). However, neither the original explanations nor those 
combined with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem have been sufficiently supported empirically 
(Leamer, 1998; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).  
 It still seems likely that a change in the characteristics of technological change affects 
wages and wage inequality, although the mechanism behind the effect is most likely not SBTC. 
In many studies on wage inequality, there seems to be an implicit assumption that workers are 
differentiated only by skills that can be acquired by any worker at the same cost. That is, workers 
are heterogeneous only in whether they intentionally acquire skills or not. However, this view 
seems to be too simple and seems to neglect some important elements in worker heterogeneity. 
Under the assumption that the source of heterogeneity of workers is only acquirable skills, the 
number of skilled workers will be determined at equilibrium where the “net” income (income 
minus cost of acquiring skills) is equalized across workers. At equilibrium, the net incomes of 
skilled and unskilled workers become identical. Hence, the difference in wages between them 
must always be equal to the cost of acquiring skills, but this seems unrealistic. Therefore, it seems 
highly likely that workers are heterogeneous before they acquire skills; this scenario seems more 
realistic, because each individual worker is in fact different from all other workers. In this paper, 
I focus on a different source of worker heterogeneity to examine wage inequality based on the 
model of total factor productivity (TFP) shown by Harashima (2009, 2016). 
 Harashima’s model is constructed on the basis of ordinary or average workers’ 
innovative intelligences, by which innovations for solving unexpected minor problems are created. 
The workers’ innovative intelligences are an important element in TFP because the knowledge 
and technologies that humans currently possess are far from perfect; therefore, workers encounter 
many unexpected day-to-day and even minute-to-minute problems at production sites. Most of 
these unexpected problems will be minor, but they still have to be solved by creating innovations. 
TFP will vary depending on how many unexpected problems workers at production sites can solve. 
If workers’ innovative intelligences are higher, they can solve more unexpected problems. That 
is, TFP depends on workers’ innovative intelligences. An important point is that workers’ 
innovative intelligences are naturally heterogeneous. In addition, workers’ wages will differ 
depending on their innovative intelligences, because innovative intelligences are directly related 
to productivities. In other words, heterogeneity in innovative intelligences will generate wage 
inequality across workers.    
 Some technologies will be advantageous for workers with relatively high innovative 
intelligences and disadvantageous for workers with relatively low innovative intelligences. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the innovative intelligences of workers will vary, and thereby their 
wages will vary depending on the types of technology used. If technologies that are advantageous 
for workers with higher innovative intelligence are introduced more frequently in a certain period 
of time, the wage inequality between workers with higher and lower innovative intelligence will 
increase during this period.  
 
2  A MECHANISM OF WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
2.1  Approximate effective production function 
In the TFP model of Harashima (2009, 2016), an essential element is the “approximate effective 
production function” (AEPF). This concept is based on ordinary or average workers’ innovative 
intelligences—that is, the intelligences used to create innovations to solve unexpected problems. 
Innovative intelligence is essential for efficient production, as will be shown in Section 3.1.1.  
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 The simplest form of AEPF is  
 
ααα LKωAσY  1   ,                           (1) 
 
where Y, A, K, and L are production, technology, capital inputs, and labor inputs, respectively; ω 
(> 0) is a parameter that indicates the productivity resulting from a worker’s innovative 
intelligence and also represents the worker’s ability to solve unexpected problems;  0σ is a 
parameter that indicates a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with regard to location; and α (> 
0) is a parameter that represents the experience curve effect. Because equation (1) has the same 
form as a Cobb-Douglas production function with regard to α, the parameter α can be interpreted 
as the labor share. In equation (1), let αωAσT  , which indicates TFP. 
 Suppose that there are two types of workers (HI and LI) who are identical except for 
their values of ω. Let ωHI and ωLI be the ω of HI and LI workers, respectively. HI workers have 
a higher innovative intelligence than LI workers and thereby ωHI > ωLI. HI and LI workers are not 
interchangeable with each other, and the numbers of them are exogenously given. Note that the 
reasons why workers have different values of ω and are not interchangeable are beyond the scope 
of economics and are the subject of studies in other fields. In this paper, I examine only what 
happens to wages when a technological change occurs to these exogenously given HI and LI 
workers. 
 Let LHI and LLI be the numbers of HI and LI workers, respectively, in an economy. Let 
LS be a unit of the “size” of the economy, and initially LIHIS LLL  . In addition, let
S
HI
HI
L
L
S  and LIS
S
LI
L
L
; thus, initially
LIHI
HI
HI
LL
L
S

 and
LIHI
LI
LI
LL
L
S

 . SHI and SLI 
can be interpreted as the sizes of the economies composed of HI and LI workers, respectively. 
Capital inputs move perfectly elastically. By modifying the simplest form of the AEPF (equation 
[1]), the production function of the economy can be described as  
 
    111 LILILIHIHIHIα SLωSLωAKσY                    (2) 
 
(see Harashima, 2017). Equation (2) can be interpreted such that the economy is a combination 
of the economies composed of HI and LI workers. Let
SL be a unit of the size of the economy 
when the population density is optimal (thereby
sL is constant). In the long run, the population 
density is optimal (see Harashima, 2017); therefore, by equation (2), the production function in 
the long run is  
 
 LILIHIHISα LωLωLAKσY   11   .                   (3) 
 
The population density is assumed to be optimal initially; thereby, 
LIHIS LLL  , where HIL
and
LIL are the initial values of LHI and LLI. 
 
2.2  Inequality in wages 
Let wHI and wLI be the wages for HI and LI workers, respectively. Because LIHISS LLLL 
holds in the long run, wHI and wLI in the long run are, by equation (3), 
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and 
 
 11 
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 S
α
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LI
LI LAKωσ
L
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w  . 
 
Hence, the following equation and inequalities are always true: 
 
  0HIw  , 
 
  0LIw  , 
 
and 
 
  1
LI
HI
LI
HI
ω
ω
w
w
 .                            (4) 
 
That is, in the long run, the ratio of wHI to wLI is constant and always equal to the ratio of ωHI to 
ωLI, and thereby   
 
  0 LIHI ww  . 
 
3  INOVATIVE INTELLIGENCE-BIASED 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
3.1  A model of innovative intelligence 
3.1.1  Essential role of workers’ innovative intelligences 
The current state of knowledge and technologies is far from perfect and always will be. As a result, 
a large number of unexpected problems occur daily at every production site, although most of 
them are minor. These numerous unexpected minor problems must be solved by creating 
innovations, and it is the ordinary or average workers at production sites who do so. Therefore, 
ordinary workers’ innovative intelligences are a significantly important element in TFP. 
 Workers also encounter, and have to fix, many unexpected minor problems, because it 
is impossible to provide workers with perfect manuals or to teach them everything about the 
technologies they use. Even if a manual for a technology is written in great detail, some parts of 
it will remain unwritten because it is too costly to make a perfect manual. The extent to which a 
manual is complete (or incomplete) depends on the balance between the cost of making the 
manual more complete and the increase in efficiency in production by making it more complete. 
The costs of producing a “thicker” manual include not only printing and other production costs, 
but also the cost of investigating the natures of an extremely large number of possible variations 
of rarely occurring minor incidents by experimenting with the problems the incidents generate. 
The cost of creating innovations to fix these problems individually will increase as the manual is 
made more complete. Therefore, a manual will be complete to the point where the marginal cost 
to enlarge it is equal to the consequent marginal increase in productivity. As a result, a large part 
of the complete instructions to use any particular piece of technology will usually be left unwritten.  
 Because not only the technologies themselves but also their corresponding instruction 
manuals are imperfect, many unexpected minor problems are going to occur day by day and 
minute by minute at production sites, and ordinary or average workers at the sites must solve 
them. Workers’ innovative intelligences (ω) therefore are essential for productivity.  
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3.1.2  The model 
Workers’ innovative intelligences can be modeled on the basis of item response theory, which is 
widely used in psychometric studies (e.g., Lord and Novick, 1968; van der Linden and Hambleton, 
1997). In particular, the item response function is used to describe the relationship between 
abilities and item responses (e.g., test scores or performances). A typical item response function 
is  
 
     cθp ~~~
  bθa
c
~~~e x p1
~1

  , 
 
where p~ is the probability of a correct response (e.g., answer) to an item (e.g., test or question), 
θ
~
(∞ >θ
~
> –∞) is a parameter that indicates an individual’s ability, a~ (> 0) is a parameter that 
characterizes the slope of the function, b
~
(∞ ≥b
~
≥ –∞) is a parameter that represents the difficulty 
of an item, and c~ (1 ≥ c~ ≥ 0) is a parameter that indicates the probability that an item can be 
answered correctly by chance.  
 As Harashima (2012) showed, on the basis of item response theory, the probability of a 
worker solving unexpected problems in a unit of time, p(θ), can be modeled as  
 
  
  bθa
c
cθp



exp1
1
 ,                      (5) 
 
where θ (∞ > θ > –∞) indicates a worker’s innovative intelligence, a (> 0) is a parameter that 
characterizes the slope of the function, b is a parameter that indicates the average difficulty of 
unexpected problems that workers have to solve, and c (1 ≥ c ≥ 0) is the probability that 
unexpected problems are solved by chance. As is evident from this function, the higher the 
worker’s innovative intelligence (i.e., the higher the value of θ), the higher the probability of 
solving unexpected problems in a unit of time.  
 Because ω in equation (1) indicates the worker’s ability to solve unexpected problems 
by utilizing innovative intelligence, ω will be positively and monotonically correlated with p(θ); 
therefore, ω can be described as a function of θ. By equation (5), therefore, TFP in equation (1) 
(i.e., αωAσT  ) can be described as   
 
  
αα Aσω
bθa
c
cωAσT









exp1
1
 
 
and thereby 
 
  
ω
bθa
c
cω









exp1
1
  ,                     (6) 
 
whereω is the unit of measurement and constant.  
 The innovative intelligence θ of each worker is assumed to be exogenously given and 
constant. Let θHI and θLI be θ of HI and LI workers, respectively, and LIHI   . Therefore,  
 
  
ω
bθa
c
cω
HI
HI









exp1
1
                     (7) 
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and 
 
  
  
ω
bθa
c
cω
LI
LI









exp1
1
 .                    (8) 
 
Evidently, 
LIHILIHI ωωθθ  . 
 
3.2  Innovative intelligence-biased technological change  
The parameter c (the probability of solving problems by chance) in equation (6) will be basically 
common to all workers and technologies, constant, and relatively small. The remaining 
parameters a and b will change with some types of technological changes. If their values are 
changed by a technological change, ωHI and ωLI will also change by equations (7) and (8), but 
they may change in different ways.  
 
3.2.1  Effect of a change in a 
By equation (6),  
 
   
      2expexp
1



bθabθa
bθωc
da
dω
 .                  (9) 
 
Equation (9) indicates that
da
dω
increases as a increases if bθ  ; conversely, 
da
dω
decreases as a 
increases if bθ  . Because b is set at a level where most workers can use the technology properly, 
as discussed in Section 3.1.1, its value will be set relatively small, and thereby generally
LIHI b   . Therefore, as a increases, ωHI increases but ωLI decreases, which means that the 
importance of a worker’s innovative intelligence (θ) in solving unexpected problems increases as 
a increases. Hence, an increase in a is advantageous for HI workers but disadvantageous for LI 
workers.  
 Note that if the value of a relative to the values of θ and b is sufficiently small, the effect 
of      bθabθa  expexp in equation (9) is sufficiently smaller than that of  bθ  in the 
numerator of equation (9) for a change in θ. In this case, if bθ  , then for the larger θ, 
da
dω
increases to a greater extent as a increases. Conversely, if bθ  , then for the smaller θ, 
da
dω
decreases to a greater extent as a increases. In this case, therefore, the property that an increase in 
a is advantageous for HI workers but disadvantageous for LI workers is amplified. Moreover, 
relatively small values of a are reasonable from the point of view of item response theory. 
 If the value of a is heterogeneous across technologies, therefore, the values of ωHI and 
ωLI vary depending on the characteristics of current technology A with regard to a. However, do 
technologies have heterogeneous values of a? They do, for the following reason. Suppose that 
there are 2 technologies; technologies 1 and 2. If technology 1 generates a larger number of 
varieties of minor unexpected problems than technology 2, workers’ innovative intelligences will 
be more important for technology 1 than technology 2. That property means that technology 1 
has larger values of a than technology 2 because the value of a is proportionate to the relative 
importance of worker’s innovative intelligence. On the other hand, the number of varieties of 
minor unexpected problems a technology generates will not be common across technologies: that 
is, it will be basically heterogeneous across technologies. Therefore, the values of a will also be 
basically heterogeneous across technologies.  
 Regardless of the type of technology, a worker who has a relatively high innovative 
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intelligence can use the technology more efficiently than a worker who has a relatively low 
innovative intelligence, so a worker with relatively high innovative intelligence is intrinsically in 
an advantageous position. In addition, if a technology has the property that it generates larger 
varieties of minor unexpected problems (i.e., has the larger value of a), the position becomes even 
more advantageous. 
 
3.2.2  Effect of a change in b 
The level of difficulty in using a technology (i.e., b) is set by the producer of the technology (or 
the producer of a machine or tool that embodies the technology), but b will not be set at a level 
where all workers can perfectly solve all unexpected problems generated by the technology 
because it is too costly to do so, as discussed in Section 3.1.1. The producer of the technology has 
to compromise and create an imperfect manual, which will be sufficiently useful for most, but not 
all, workers; therefore, some workers cannot use the technology sufficiently properly. Suppose 
that the difficulty b is set at a level at which the highest h (1 > h > 0) proportion of workers can 
solve unexpected problems at a rate above the probability v (1 > v > 0). Clearly, if h is smaller, b 
is larger, and vice versa. The value of h will be smaller if the number of possible varieties of rarely 
occurring minor incidents generated by a technology is larger, because the manual becomes more 
imperfect (Section 3.1.1).    
 By equation (6), 
 
  
 
      2e x pe x p
1



bθabθa
ωca
db
dω  , 
 
and thereby, for any θ, 
 
  0
d b
dω
 .                               (10) 
 
Inequality (10) indicates that an increase in b decreases both ωHI and ωLI. In addition, by the 
extreme value condition 
 
   
     
     
0
2e x pe x p
e x pe x p
1
2
2 















bθabθa
bθabθa
ωca
d
db
dω
d

 , 
 
when b ,  0
db
dω
is smallest (i.e., the negative effect of an increase in b is largest). As 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, because b is set at a level where most workers can use the technology 
properly, the value of b will be small. Hence, the value of θ when b = θ will generally be less than 
the average θ of all workers; furthermore it will be set close to θ, not to the average θ. Therefore, 
in general, the negative effect of an increase in b will be larger for LI workers than for HI workers. 
That is, as with a, the value of b is generally proportionate to the relative importance of a worker’s 
innovative intelligence. 
 Because b and the importance of innovative intelligence are positively correlated, the 
values of b will be basically heterogeneous across technologies for the same reasons as for the 
case of a, and a technology that generates a relatively large number of varieties of minor 
unexpected problems will have a larger value of b. Therefore, as with a, the values of ωHI and ωLI 
will vary depending on the value of b corresponding to the current technology A. 
 In addition, because the effects of a and b have similar properties, it is highly likely that 
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a technology that has a relatively large value of a also has a relatively large value of b.  
 
3.2.3  IIBT and IIBTC 
Because a and b are basically heterogeneous across technologies, technologies can be categorized 
depending on their values of a and b. However, as shown in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, a technology 
that has a relatively large value of a will probably also have a relatively large value of b. Hence, 
technologies can be categorized solely depending on their values of a. I call a technology an 
“innovation intelligence-biased technology” (IIBT) if the technology has a greater value of a than 
the average a of all technologies. In addition, I call an increase in the average a of all technologies 
in an economy an “innovation intelligence-biased technological change” (IIBTC). 
 What kind of technologies are IIBT? By its nature, IIBT generates a relatively large 
number of varieties of minor unexpected problems. The number of varieties of problems will 
increase as the number of possible different situations a technology will encounter becomes larger, 
because different situations will generally generate different varieties of problems. This implies 
that IIBTs are technologies that can be used in relatively more varied and diverse situations: that 
is, they are applicable to a relatively wide range of situations. Technologies that are closely related 
to information and communication technology (ICT) may be such technologies and thereby may 
belong to IIBT. The increasing prevalence of ICT throughout the economy in recent decades 
therefore may have caused IIBTC. 
 
3.3  The increase in wage inequality and IIBTC 
If a new technology is IIBT and causes IIBTC, 
HIω increases but LIω decreases. Thereby, the 
ratio
LI
HI
ω
ω
increases. As shown in Section 2, wages are determined in the long run at the point 
satisfying
LI
HI
LI
HI
ω
ω
w
w
 (equation [4]). Thereby, 
LI
HI
w
w
will also increase if IIBTC occurs; that is, 
the inequality in wages between HI and LI workers will increase. IIBTC therefore increases wage 
inequality.  
 If IIBTC prevails over a certain period of time, wage inequality will increase during the 
period. Increases in wage inequality in many countries in recent decades may have occurred 
because IIBTC prevailed during this time period. If ICT is really an IIBT as argued in Section 
3.2.3, IIBTC caused by the development and prevalence of ICT in recent decades may have 
caused increases in wage inequality. 
 However, even if IIBTC prevailed in many countries in recent decades, there is no 
guarantee that IIBTC will always prevail. There are many kinds of technologies, and new 
technologies cannot always be used in relatively more varied and diverse situations. The recent 
decades, during which ICT was substantially improved, may be an exceptional period. If anything, 
technological changes may be neutral on average with regard to workers’ innovative intelligences, 
and the ratio
LI
HI
LI
HI
ω
ω
w
w
 (equation [4]) may be constant in the very long run.  
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Explanations for recent increases in wage inequality based on SBTC have not been sufficiently 
supported empirically. In this paper, IIBTC was examined as a possible important source of 
increasing wage inequality. Workers’ innovative intelligences are an important element in TFP, 
and they can be heterogeneous across workers. In addition, this heterogeneity will have great 
impacts on workers’ wages. In this paper, I showed that the impacts on wages differ across 
heterogeneous workers depending on the characteristics of the technologies used for production. 
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IIBT is advantageous for workers with relatively high innovative intelligences and 
disadvantageous for workers with relatively low innovative intelligence. Hence, if IIBTC occurs, 
inequality in wages will increase among heterogeneous workers.  
 If IIBTC continues to prevail over a certain period of time, the inequality in wages 
between workers with higher and lower innovative intelligences will increase during the period. 
Recent decades may have been such a period, possibly because of rapid development of ICT. 
However, it is also true that IIBTC will not necessarily prevail in any given period. 
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